The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation convenes in San Diego today to decide whether to consolidate more than 100 lawsuits that have been filed against Toyota, and in which jurisdiction to consolidate them.
Toyota’s recent recalls have prompted a variety of lawsuits against the company. Toyota buyers have filed class action lawsuits against the company over the plummeting value of their vehicles. Toyota shareholders have filed class action lawsuits against the company accusing it of hiding its problems in order to boost its share price. And dozens of personal injury lawsuits have been filed against the auto maker for injuries and deaths caused by sudden acceleration and other product defects. Perhaps the most high profile of those personal injury cases was filed in San Diego, site of today’s hearing, on behalf of Officer Mark Saylor, a California Highway Patrol Officer who was killed, along with three of his family members, when the Lexus he was driving suddenly accelerated out of control.
Today’s hearing before the Judicial Panel addresses only the consumer lawsuits concerning diminution in value. However, the court in which those cases are ultimately consolidatedm if they are consolidated, will become the likely destination for other other lawsuits against the company. For example, a Mississippi federal judge recently stayed a sudden acceleration lawsuit in that state pending the Judicial Panel’s decision.
The seven-member Judicial Panel can send the cases anywhere in the country. The judges weigh factors such as a court’s caseload, the convenience of the location for the parties, and whether a judge with experience managing complex litigation is available. Of these factors, the last is likely the most important.
Toyota is pushing for the cases to be consolidated in a Los Angeles federal court, where the most lawsuits have been filed and where the company’s North American headquarters is located. Lawyers for the plaintiffs are divided over location, with 19 different sites being urged by different factions. Likely destinations for the consolidated litigation include Kentucky, New Orleans and Los Angeles. A decision is expected within two weeks.
To a listen to an NPR story regarding today’s hearing, click here.
It’s been a busy couple of weeks for tort reformers and their opponents.
As we reported in an earlier posting, the Georgia Supreme Court this week struck down the $350,000.00 cap on pain and suffering damages in med mal cases as an unconstitutional with Georgians’ right to trial by jury. The decision was a decisive victory for med mal victims and for opponents of tort reform.
The previous week, however, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld two other components of the contraversial 2005 tort reform legislation: (1) the “gross negligence” standard applicable to ER malpractice cases; and (2) the “offer of judgment” rule.
The “gross negligence” standard was challenged by Carol Gliemmo, who became paralyzed when a Columbus ER doctor failed to diagnose her with a brain hemorrhage. She argued that the gross negligence standard–which required her to prove that the ER doc knowingly mistreated her–created an unreasonable and insurmountable hurdle. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed. Justice George Carley, who wrote the majority opinion, stated that it was “entirely logical” for lawmakers to approve the legislation to stem the rising cost of medical malpractice lawsuits.
The “offer of judgment” rule was challenged by Salon and Cheryl Baptiste. The Baptiste’s filed a defamation lawsuit against former Falcon Chuck Smith. Mr. Smith made a $5,000.00 “offer of judgment” to the Baptiste’s, which they rejected. The court ultimately dismissed the Baptiste’s lawsuit. Mr. Smith moved to collect his attorneys’ fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, the offer of judgment statute. That statute permits either party to extend to the other an offer of judgment (as Mr. Smith had done) which, if rejected, could lead to the rejecting party paying the offering party’s attorneys’ fees. The trial court, however, denied Mr. Smith’s motion on the grounds that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 unconstitutionally interferes with litigants’ right of access to Georgia courts. The Supreme Court rejected that argument in upholding the offer of judgment statute.
